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 II.-385 
TIME IS MONEY, LADIES: THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT PROHIBITED PRIOR PAY AS  
A FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX IN  
RIZO v. YOVINO 
Abstract: On February 27, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Rizo v. Yovino held that prior salary is not a valid defense against an employ-
ee’s claim under the Equal Pay Act (EPA). In so doing, the Ninth Circuit ruled 
that prior pay is an inherently gendered factor and became the first federal circuit 
court to eliminate it as a valid factor other than sex under the EPA. This Com-
ment argues that Rizo was correctly decided but that it could have gone even fur-
ther to narrow the pay gap in the United States. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, Lilly Ledbetter, a female worker at Goodyear Tire, sued her em-
ployer, alleging that the company had suppressed her wages throughout her 
twenty-year career because of her sex.1 Ledbetter’s case went all the way up to 
the Supreme Court.2 Although the Court ruled against Ledbetter, the case re-
sulted in one of the most monumental dissenting opinions penned by the late 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 622 (2007). Ledbetter originally 
brought claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act (EPA), in 
addition to other discrimination claims. Id. at 621–22. Ledbetter brought her case before the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 
99-C-3137, 2003 WL 25507253, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2003). The district court denied or dis-
missed the majority of Ledbetter’s discrimination claims, except for her Title VII claim. See id. (not-
ing that the jury found strong evidence supporting Ledbetter’s Title VII claim). As a result, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit only reviewed the Title VII claim. Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1175 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the lion’s share of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007 majority opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. focused on 
Title VII, but there is relevant discussion of the EPA in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. See 550 U.S. at 
658 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referencing the distinction between Ledbetter’s EPA claim and her 
Title VII claim, as well as the Court’s precedents regarding the EPA). Title VII refers to a section of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prevents employers from discriminating against employees on the 
basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991). EPA claimants 
often assert concurrent claims under Title VII because both laws apply to sex-based wage discrimina-
tion. See Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Mar. 14, 2021), https://www.
eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/YDM7-N8ZX] (recommending that plaintiffs filing under 
the EPA also file claims under Title VII). Title VII claims, however, require a different burden of 
proof than EPA claims. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establish-
ing the burden-shifting scheme applied to Title VII suits); infra note 31 and accompanying text (com-
paring the burdens of proof of plaintiffs in EPA litigation versus Title VII litigation). 
 2 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 618. Justice Alito authored the majority opinion in Ledbetter, and Chief 
Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 620. 
II.-386 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.3 In her 2007 dissent in Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., Justice Ginsburg wrote that wage discrimination can be 
one of the most elusive forms of prejudice in the workplace.4 
Despite her loss in court, Ledbetter prevailed in her fight for equality 
when President Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (FPA) into 
law.5 Before this emblematic legislation, in 1963, Congress attempted to recti-
fy sex-based pay inequality through the Equal Pay Act (EPA) that made it ille-
gal to base an employee’s wage on sex or a factor related to sex.6 And yet, in 
2020, the average American female still only made eighty-one cents on the 
dollar compared to her male counterpart.7 Thus, the cautionary words of Jus-
tice Ginsburg have proved to bear an enduring relevance.8 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. at 643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). With the passing of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in Sep-
tember 2020, women across the United States, including Lilly Ledbetter, remembered her iconic 
Ledbetter dissent. Howard Koplowitz, ‘I Lost a Dear Friend & a Champion’: Lilly Ledbetter Mourns 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, ADVANCE LOCAL ALA. (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.al.com/news/2020/09/i-
lost-a-dear-friend-and-a-champion-lilly-ledbetter-mourns-death-of-ruth-bader-ginsburg.html [https://
perma.cc/YUJ8-RMG7]. 
 4 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The realities of the workplace reveal why 
the discrimination with respect to compensation . . . does not fit within the category of singular dis-
crete acts ‘easy to identify.’ . . .  Compensation disparities . . . are often hidden from sight.”). 
 5 See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (allowing successful plaintiffs under Title VII to re-
ceive back pay for lost wages due to discrimination). The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (FPA) over-
turned the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter by amending the statutory provisions of Title VII to 
allow plaintiffs to bring discrimination claims against employers retroactively. Equal Pay Act of 1963 
& Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.
gov/laws/guidance/equal-pay-act-1963-and-lilly-ledbetter-fair-pay-act-2009 [https://perma.cc/6MS5-
UVUP]. 
 6 See H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 2 (1963), as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 688 (explaining that 
setting an employee’s pay solely based on sex constitutes an “unfair labor standard”). The EPA 
amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 to make sex-based wage discrimination ille-
gal. Equal Pay Act of 1963, sec. 3, § 206(d)(1), 77 Stat. 56, 56–57. 
 7 Amy Stewart, The 2020 Gender Pay Gap Report Reveals That Women Still Earn Less for Equal 
Work, PAYSCALE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.payscale.com/compensation-today/2020/03/the-2020-
gender-pay-gap-report-reveals-that-women-still-earn-less-for-equal-work [https://perma.cc/8U3U-
A6CS]. This finding is consistent with the most recently published data from the federal government, 
which reported that the wage gap in 2018 was nineteen cents on the dollar. U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
HIGHLIGHTS IN WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2018, at 1 (2019), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-
earnings/2018/pdf/home.pdf [https://perma.cc/G96J-F684]. Although the pay gap has been closing 
incrementally over the past several decades, men and women in the United States are still not compen-
sated equally for equal work. The Wage Gap Over Time: In Real Dollars, Women See a Continuing 
Gap, NAT’L COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, https://www.pay-equity.org/info-time.html [https://perma.
cc/K86V-DWGS] (Sept. 2020) (reporting that the pay gap has been closing by about half a cent every 
year between 1963 and 2010). 
 8 See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (warning that sex-based pay discrimi-
nation is often imperceptible because it occurs in “small increments” that “develop[] only over time”); 
infra note 77 and accompanying text (enumerating enacted and pending legislation addressing the pay 
gap at the state and federal levels); see also Orly Lobel, Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information 
Flows and the Future of Pay Equity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 566 (2020) (discussing the Obama 
administration’s various efforts to rectify the pay gap). 
2021] The Ninth Circuit Eliminates Prior Pay from the EPA II.-387 
In 2020, in Rizo v. Yovino, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
decided a case that embodied the shadowy discrimination Justice Ginsburg 
alluded to in Ledbetter.9 In Rizo, a female teacher challenged her school dis-
trict’s compensation scheme, which based her pay on the salary she earned at 
her former job.10 The teacher, Aileen Rizo, argued that because prior pay is a 
factor related to sex, the EPA forbid the school district from using it as the ba-
sis for her salary.11 The Ninth Circuit held in Rizo’s favor, setting a precedent 
that prior pay is inherently related to an employee’s sex and thus can never 
serve as a defense to an EPA claim.12 Meanwhile, other jurisdictions have 
maintained that, under certain circumstances, employers may base salary on an 
employee’s prior pay.13 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s novel ruling has reinvigorat-
ed the debate over prior pay and its role in EPA litigation.14 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the legislative history be-
hind the EPA, as well as the factual and procedural context of Rizo.15 Part II 
examines the split among the federal circuit courts on the correct meaning of 
the EPA affirmative defense at issue in Rizo.16 Finally, Part III argues that the 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that female employees are 
frequently unaware that they receive disparate pay compared to male coworkers); Rizo v. Yovino, 950 
F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (holding that a public school district discriminated against a fe-
male math teacher’s wage in violation of the Equal Pay Act), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 (2020). 
 10 See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1222 (summarizing the plaintiff Aileen Rizzo’s central claim against the 
Fresno County school system). 
 11 See id. (outlining Rizo’s principal argument that using prior pay to defend an employee’s wage 
frustrates the legislative intent of the EPA). 
 12 See id. at 1229 (holding that prior pay is too closely related to an employee’s sex to defeat an 
EPA claim brought against an employer). 
 13 See, e.g., EEOC v. Md. Ins. Admin., 879 F.3d 114, 123 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that employers 
need a job-related factor to establish salary); Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(noting that valid factors under the fourth defense must be somewhat related to the employee’s job 
performance); Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 70 F. App’x 500, 508 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
salaries based on additional factors beyond prior pay are valid under the EPA); Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 
949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that prior pay must be used to set salary in combination with other 
job-related factors); Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992) (reason-
ing that the legislative intent of the EPA was to prevent salary discrimination on factors unrelated to 
the employer’s business objectives); see also infra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining the 
circumstances under which some circuit courts have found prior pay to be a permissible factor other 
than sex). 
 14 See Jessica Gottsacker, Note, Waging War Against Prior Pay: The Pay Structure that Reen-
forces the Systematic Gender Discrimination in the Workplace, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 113, 138 (2019) 
(describing the “turmoil” over the proper interpretation of prior pay in the wake of Rizo); Patricia J. 
Martin et al., Minding the Pay Gap: What Employers Need to Know as Pay Equity Protections Widen, 
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 12 (2019), https://www.littler.com/files/pay_equity_littler_report_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZU2X-AD9B] (explaining the challenges employers now face in salary-setting prac-
tices as a result of the new restrictions surrounding prior pay). 
 15 See infra notes 18–47 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 48–78 and accompanying text. 
II.-388 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
Ninth Circuit correctly decided Rizo because an employer cannot use prior pay 
to set an employee’s salary without discriminating based on sex.17 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EPA AND RIZO V. YOVINO 
In 1963, Congress passed the EPA to cure the ongoing pay disparity be-
tween men and women.18 Yet, the pay gap still persists today.19 Section A of 
this Part reviews the legislative history of the EPA and the mechanics of mak-
ing an EPA claim.20 Section B discusses the facts and procedural history of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2020 decision in Rizo v. Yovino.21 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 79–106 and accompanying text. 
 18 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206). Congress passed the EPA as an amendment to the FLSA. Id. The FLSA regulates employment 
at the federal level through provisions such as minimum wage, child labor laws, and other actions 
employees may bring against their employers. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. 
 19 U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 7, at 1. Typically, courts understand the pay gap as the 
average salary differential between men and women. See Rizo v. Yovino, 950 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th 
Cir. 2020) (en banc) (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (explaining 
that the legislative intent of the EPA was to address archaic conventions that men deserve a higher 
wage), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 (2020)). Some scholars, however, debate whether the EPA’s refer-
ence to “sex,” means gender or sexual orientation. See Adam P. Romero, Does the Equal Pay Act 
Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity?, 10 ALA. CIV. RTS. & 
CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 35, 39 (2019) (noting that the EPA discusses “opposite sexes,” implying that 
the statute originally considered a binary understanding of the term). In the 2020 Supreme Court case, 
Bostock v. Clayton County, employees who brought discrimination claims under Title VII argued that 
“sex” encompasses sexual orientation. 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020). Justice Gorsuch, writing for the 
majority, neither confirmed nor rejected this notion. See id. (explaining that it was not necessary for 
the decision to adopt a different definition of “sex” other than as a “biological distinction[]”). The 
terms “sex” and “gender” are not interchangeable or binary. What Is Gender? What Is Sex?, CAN. 
INSTS. HEALTH RSCH. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/48642.html [https://web.archive.org/
web/20210306211816/https://cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/48642.html]. Yet, the terms are often conflated in 
scholarship on the pay gap, and the research frequently fails to honor the immense complexity behind 
sex and gender identities. See Quick Facts About the Gender Wage Gap, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS n.2 
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2020/03/24/482141/quick-
facts-gender-wage-gap/ [https://perma.cc/BY2V-C9HR] (acknowledging that the pay gap historically 
refers to men and women, but that modern research is beginning to expand the definition to pay ineq-
uities between other groups in the American workforce); see also Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare De-
sire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 571 (2016) 
(showing that transgender people are gaining traction in sex discrimination lawsuits based on their 
gender identities). Although the scope of this Comment is limited to discussing the pay disparity be-
tween males and females, sex-based wage discrimination and the pay gap is not an exclusively female 
issue. See Romero, supra, at 92 (showing that recent studies report systematic sex-based pay discrimi-
nation against the LGBTQ community). Therefore, this Comment uses the term “sex” to discuss the 
pay gap more broadly and limits the use of terms like “gender” and “gendered” in referencing women 
as a group, because “woman” is not a sex-based identity. See What Is Gender? What Is Sex?, supra 
(defining the term “sex” as a “set of biological attributes” versus “gender,” which is a composition of 
“socially constructed roles, behaviors, expressions, and identities”). 
 20 See infra notes 22–31 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 32–47 and accompanying text. 
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A. Making and Defending Against an EPA Claim 
The goal of the EPA is simple: guarantee equal pay for equal work.22 Spe-
cifically, the EPA requires employers to pay the same wage for work that de-
mands equal “skill, effort, and responsibility” in substantially the same envi-
ronment.23 Congress understood, however, that an employer may have a genu-
ine reason for paying a male employee more than a female employee in the 
same job.24 Accordingly, the EPA permits unequal pay between the sexes if 
there is a “bona fide” reason.25 The law divides the permissible justifications 
into four categories, which operate as the four affirmative defenses to an EPA 
claim.26 The four affirmative defenses are (1) systems based on seniority; (2) 
systems based on merit; (3) systems that correlate salary to a quantifiable out-
put or quality result; and (4) any distinction “based on any other factor other 
than sex.”27 The fourth defense, any factor other than sex, is the broadest.28 
                                                                                                                           
 22 H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 2 (1963), as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 688. 
 23 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). In relevant part, the text of the EPA provides that “[n]o employer . . . 
shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex . . . for equal work on jobs the perfor-
mance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility.” Id. 
 24 See H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 3, U.S.C.C.CA.N. 688–89 (recognizing that employers may have 
a multitude of legitimate reasons to pay a different wage to two employees of the opposite sex). For 
example, Congress said that availability to work a night shift, ability to perform physical labor, and 
previous skills and training would all be acceptable reasons for a pay disparity under the EPA. Id. 
 25 Id.; see Bona fide, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining bona fide as “made in 
good faith; without fraud or deceit”). 
 26 Jerald J. Director, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provisions of Equal Pay Act of 
1963 (29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d)) Prohibiting Wage Discrimination on Basis of Sex, 7 A.L.R. Fed. 707 
§ 2(a) (1971); see Affirmative defense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25 (defining affirma-
tive defense as a defensive argument in which the defendant accepts all of the plaintiff’s claims as true 
but asserts new “facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s . . . claim”). 
 27 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The House Report explained that the EPA lists four bona fide excep-
tions for employers. H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 3, U.S.C.C.C.A.N. 688–89. Three of these are narrow 
in scope, and the fourth exception is the broadest. Id. The original EPA bill brought before the Senate 
contained only the “factor other than sex” exception, leading some scholars to believe that the three 
preceding exemptions that Congress ultimately included were actually meant to limit, not broaden, the 
fourth defense. Nina Joan Kimball, Not Just Any “Factor Other Than Sex”: An Analysis of the Fourth 
Affirmative Defense of the Equal Pay Act, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 318, 324 (1984). For the sake of 
clarity and continuity, this Comment refers to the fourth affirmative defense or factor other than sex 
defense as “the fourth defense.” See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (listing the four defenses included in the 
EPA). 
 28 See Elizabeth A. Stevenson, Note, Is Prior Salary a Factor Other Than Sex?: An Approach to 
Resolve the Ongoing Debate, 98 NEB. L. REV. 996, 1001 (2020) (noting that the fourth defense has led 
to the most contention and confusion in the courts). Congress included the fourth affirmative defense as 
a practical measure because it would be impossible to list every potential exception or rationale an em-
ployer may have for offering different salaries to employees of different sexes. H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 
3, U.S.C.C.A.N. 688–89. In practice, the fourth affirmative defense has become the most frequently 
cited affirmative defense by employers defending against EPA violations. 4 STATE & LOCAL GOV. C.R. 
LIAB. Statutory Defenses—Any Factor Other Than Sex § 7:14 (2020). There is much debate surround-
ing the language of the fourth affirmative defense, with some arguing that what Congress initially intend-
II.-390 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
To prevail on an EPA claim, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of 
wage discrimination based on sex.29 If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to 
the employer to demonstrate that the salary is justified under one of the EPA’s 
four affirmative defenses.30 If the employer is able to do so, the case ends 
there.31 
B. Factual and Procedural History of Rizo 
The Fresno County, California school district hired Aileen Rizo, an expe-
rienced educator, as a math consultant in October 2009.32 Upon hiring Rizo, 
Fresno County set her salary according to its regular practice.33 The practice in 
                                                                                                                           
ed as a safety valve has actually become a “catchall” for employers to circumvent the EPA’s require-
ments. Id. 
 29 See Neonu Jewell, Equal Pay Act, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 625, 632–33 (2003) (describing the 
courts’ criteria for determining whether a plaintiff established prima facie that her work involves equal 
“skill, effort, and responsibility” as one of her male colleagues being paid a higher wage); see also 
Prima facie, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25 (defining prima facie as enough to “establish 
a fact,” or something that appears true upon first impression). 
 30 See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974) (ruling that the Secretary of 
Labor, who represented female employees at the Corning plants, had established a prima facie case of 
pay discrimination, shifting the burden to Corning to show that the wage differentials between male 
and female employees were justified under one of the EPA’s four defenses). 
 31 See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 469, 471 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
employee had lost her opportunity to present further evidence once the employer properly asserted the 
fourth defense). The plaintiff’s opportunity to present evidence under the EPA is notably different 
than the burden-shifting scheme that exists under Title VII. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (holding that in a Title VII claim, a plaintiff is afforded an additional oppor-
tunity to present evidence after the defendant employer has asserted its defense). Under the Title VII 
burden-shifting framework, plaintiffs may present evidence to show that the employer’s defense is 
merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see Ross B. Goldman, Note, Putting Pretext in Context: Em-
ployment Discrimination, the Same-Actor Inference, and the Proper Roles of Judges and Juries, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (2007) (explaining that the burden-shifting scheme allows the plaintiff to 
demonstrate the employer’s “real motivation” to the court). In contrast, under the EPA, plaintiffs are 
barred from arguing that the employer’s purported defense is a pretext for discrimination. See 
Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 469 (noting that the plaintiff’s burden in EPA litigation is different from Title 
VII suits because there is no “disparate-impact component” (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 
452 U.S. 161, 170–71 (1981))). In 1981, in County of Washington v. Gunther, the Supreme Court 
explained that the difference in burden shifting schemes between Title VII claims and EPA claims is a 
reflection of the scope of each law. 452 U.S. 161, 178, 179 (1981). An EPA claim is only appropriate 
when a female employee can show she is paid less compared to a male employee performing equal 
work, whereas Title VII claims may be applied to any discriminatory practice by an employer, regard-
less of whether the plaintiff can juxtapose her salary against that of a male colleague. Id. 
 32 Rizo v. Yovino, 950 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 
(2020). Before starting as a math consultant in Fresno County, Rizo taught middle school math for six 
years and spent three years as head of a math department. Id. Rizo had one master’s degree in education 
technology and another master’s degree in mathematics education. Id. 
 33 Id. Standardized salary-setting procedures are common in public sector jobs and are a frequent 
source of EPA litigation. See, e.g., EEOC v. Md. Ins. Admin., 879 F.3d 114, 116–17 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(reviewing the validity of a state agency policy to assign a salary based on a new employee’s “grade 
level”); Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 1992) (assessing the legiti-
2021] The Ninth Circuit Eliminates Prior Pay from the EPA II.-391 
Fresno County is to set an employee’s starting salary at the rate of their previ-
ous salary plus five percent.34 The resulting amount assigns the employee to a 
correlated step on the County’s pay scale.35 
After three years, Rizo learned that Fresno County placed a newly hired 
male colleague above her on the district’s pay scale, despite him having less 
experience.36 Shortly thereafter, Rizo found out she was, in fact, receiving 
lower pay than all three of the other math consultants in the department—all of 
whom were males.37 Rizo raised her concerns about this disparity with a Fres-
no County administrator, who assured her that the pay scale system was ap-
plied indiscriminately of a new employee’s sex.38 Upon further research, Rizo 
learned that, on average, a newly hired female was more likely to start at a 
lower step on the pay scale than a newly hired male.39 After determining that 
she was not the only female employee undervalued by Fresno County’s pay 
scale system, Rizo decided to take legal action under the EPA.40 
Originally, Rizo filed her claim in the Fresno County Superior Court, but 
the school district successfully removed the case to the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of California.41 The district court reasoned that Fresno 
                                                                                                                           
macy of a New York county’s policy to base pay eligibility on the results of a civil service exam as 
opposed to the actual work performed by the employees). 
 34 Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1220. Thus, the pay scale system calculated Rizo’s salary by increasing her 
prior wage of $50,630 by 5%, plus an additional bonus for her master’s degree. Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. The male colleague’s starting salary was $79,088 compared to Rizo’s starting salary of 
$62,133. Id. 
 37 Appellee’s Answering Brief at 7, Rizo v. Yovino, 950 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 (2020) (No. 16-15372), 2016 WL 5846093, at *7. In her brief to the Ninth 
Circuit, Rizo noted that the three other male math consultants were surprised to hear that Rizo was 
still working her way up the school district’s pay scale given that she had the most experience. Id. at 
5. 
 38 Id. at 7–8. 
 39 See id. at 13 (presenting statistical data that the present pay system placed the average female 
employee at a 6.7 pay step and the average male employee at a 7.7 pay step). Further, Fresno County 
performed an internal data study showing that under its previous pay system, which based wages on 
education and experience rather than prior pay, female employees received higher wages on average. 
See id. (introducing evidence that the experience-based pay scale assigned the average female em-
ployee at a step 7.2 on the pay scale, whereas it put the average male employee at a step 5 on the same 
scale). 
 40 See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1220 (describing how Rizo filed a claim in Fresno County Superior Court 
claiming that Fresno County’s pay policy was discriminatory under the EPA). Rizo’s initial action 
also cited a violation under Title VII, as well as claims for sex discrimination and failure to prevent 
discrimination under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. 
 41Id. The named defendant-appellant was Jim Yovino, the Fresno County Superintendent of 
Schools. Rizo v. Yovino, No. 14-cv-0423, 2015 WL 13236875, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015), vacat-
ed and remanded by 854 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc granted, 869 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2017), aff’d, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018), remanded and vacated on procedural grounds, 139 S. Ct. 
706 (2019), aff’d, 950 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 (2020). The court per-
mitted Fresno County to remove the case to federal court because the case arose under a federal stat-
ute. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(1)(A)).  
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County’s pay system impermissibly perpetuated the existing gap between fe-
male and male teachers’ salaries.42 Fresno County appealed the ruling.43 When 
Rizo first appeared before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
Fresno County argued that its pay scale system was valid under the EPA’s 
fourth defense.44 A three-judge panel from the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of 
Fresno County because, according its own precedent, prior pay is allowed un-
der the fourth defense when the employer can show it serves a real business 
purpose.45 The Ninth Circuit judges then voted to rehear the case en banc.46 
Upon rehearing, the court overruled its precedent and held that prior pay is not 
a factor other than sex under any circumstances.47 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See Rizo, 2015 WL 13236875, at *9 (determining that discriminatory outcomes were a “virtual 
certainty” under Fresno County’s system). 
 43 See id. (denying Fresno County’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that a pay system 
based on prior pay contradicts Congress’s intent behind the EPA). 
 44 Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc granted, 869 F.3d 
1004 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018), remanded and vacated on procedural 
grounds, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019), aff’d, 950 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 
(2020). 
 45 See id. at 1167 (noting that when the use of prior pay “effectuate[s] some business policy” it 
qualifies as a factor other than sex (quoting Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876–77 (9th Cir. 
1982))). In 1982, in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Ninth Circuit held that prior pay may be a 
factor other than sex under the EPA as long as it is supported by a legitimate business-related practice. 
691 F.2d at 878. The court also ruled that a factor other than sex does not need to be job-related in and 
of itself. Id. at 877. Thus, in the Ninth Circuit’s 2017 opinion in Rizo v. Yovino, Fresno County was 
entitled to present evidence showing a legitimate business reason for using prior pay in its system. See 
Rizo, 854 F.3d at 1167. As a result, the three-judge panel ruled that the case should be remanded to the 
trial court for further findings of fact regarding Fresno County’s true purpose for using prior pay as a 
salary-setting factor. See id. (noting further that Fresno County would bear the burden at trial to show 
its use of prior pay was non-discriminatory). 
 46 Rizo v. Yovino, 869 F.3d 1004, 1004 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018), re-
manded and vacated on procedural grounds, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019), aff’d, 950 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 
2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 (2020). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a), 
active service circuit judges may, by a majority vote, elect to rehear a previous decision en banc. Fed. 
R. App. P. 35(a). 
 47 See Rizo v. Yovino, 950 F.3d 1217, 1232 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (ruling that prior pay is not 
a valid defense under the EPA), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 (2020). The en banc opinion the Ninth 
Circuit issued in 2020 was actually the court’s second en banc opinion. See generally Rizo v. Yovino, 
887 F.3d 453, 479 (9th Cir. 2018), remanded and vacated on procedural grounds, 139 S. Ct. 706 
(2019), aff’d, 950 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 (2020). (constituting the 
court’s original en banc opinion). In its first en banc ruling from 2018, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
prior pay could theoretically be permissible under the EPA if an employer could prove a female em-
ployee’s prior pay was not discriminatory. Id. at 478. The court concluded, however, that sex discrim-
ination is so entwined with the American job market that this is a nearly insurmountable burden of 
proof for the employer. Id. at 479. Therefore, as a practical matter, the court ruled that prior pay can 
never be a factor other than sex. See id. (overturning the Ninth Circuit’s precedent in Kouba that al-
lowed for prior pay under the fourth defense in some circumstances). Fresno County appealed the 
Ninth Circuit’s en banc ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706, 707 
(2019) (granting Fresno County’s appeal). The Court granted certiorari to cure an error that the Ninth 
Circuit committed. See id. at 710 (granting certiorari and then promptly vacating and remanding the 
case to the Ninth Circuit); see also Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1221 n.2 (explaining why the Supreme Court 
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II. IN AN EFFORT TO NARROW THE PAY GAP, THE NINTH  
CIRCUIT WIDENED THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In 2020, in Rizo v. Yovino, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
ruled that prior pay is never a factor other than sex.48 In doing so, the Ninth 
Circuit became the only circuit court to wholly eliminate prior pay as a possi-
ble defense to an EPA claim.49 Section A of this Part outlines the three princi-
pal ways circuit courts have interpreted the fourth defense.50 Section B pro-
vides the historical context behind prior pay and describes how this history has 
colored courts’ treatment of it as a factor other than sex.51 
A. The Chasm Between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits  
(and Everything in Between) 
The circuit courts hold a range of views on the fourth defense.52 At one 
end of the spectrum, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held 
that prior pay may always be a factor other than sex.53 At the opposite end, in 
                                                                                                                           
remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit after the circuit court issued its first en banc opinion). The 
Supreme Court noted that Judge Stephen Reinhardt, who authored the Ninth Circuit’s first en banc 
opinion, passed away eleven days before the opinion was published. Yovino, 139 S. Ct. at 710. The 
Court ruled that the Ninth Circuit should not have issued an opinion after one of its majority judges 
had died. See id. (reasoning that the Ninth Circuit essentially allowed one of its judges to make a rul-
ing from the grave by issuing the opinion after his death). The Court reasoned that a judge’s power 
does not extend after life and thus remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit. Id. In 2020, on remand, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled against Fresno County for a second time. See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1221 (affirming the 
denial of Fresno County’s motion for summary judgment). After the second en banc ruling from the 
Ninth Circuit, Fresno County again petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, but the Court denied 
the petition. Yovino v. Rizo, 141 S. Ct. 189, at *1 (July 2, 2020) (mem.). 
 48 Rizo v. Yovino, 950 F.3d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 
(2020). Procedurally, the en banc Ninth Circuit effectively ended the case by affirming the lower 
court’s decision to deny Fresno County’s initial motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1221. Substan-
tively, the Ninth Circuit confirmed its previous 1982 ruling in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co. that an 
employee’s previous salary does not fall within the scope of the EPA but went even further to say that 
the fourth defense is limited to factors related to an employee’s current job. See id. at 1230 (narrowing 
the factor other than sex defense to “job-related factors”); Kouba v. Allstate Ins., Co., 691 F.2d 873, 
876 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that employers may base wages on “acceptable business reason[s]”). 
 49 See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1230 (distinguishing itself from the interpretation other circuit courts 
have adopted about the fourth defense); see also Jennifer Safstrom, Note, Salary History and Pay 
Parity: Assessing Prior Salary History as a “Factor Other Than Sex” in Equal Pay Act Litigation, 31 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 137–38 (2019) (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was particularly 
significant because it changed legal precedent on the EPA’s fourth defense and simultaneously exac-
erbated the split among the circuit courts over what constitutes a factor other than sex). 
 50 See infra notes 52–71 and accompanying text. 
 51 See infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 53 See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that 
construing the fourth defense broadly would best further Congress’s original intent). In 2005, in 
Wernsing v. Department of Human Services, the Seventh Circuit rejected the notion that prior pay 
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Rizo, the Ninth Circuit eliminated prior pay as a factor other than sex altogeth-
er.54 The majority of circuit courts fall somewhere in between, limiting factors 
other than sex to a legitimate business or job-specific reason.55 
The Seventh Circuit has maintained that employers may always set wages 
based on an employee’s prior pay because prior pay is not related to sex.56 In 
1994, in Dey v. Colt Construction & Development Co., the Seventh Circuit 
maintained that Congress intended the fourth defense to be a broad excep-
tion.57 The court held that Congress’s only goal was to stop sex discrimination, 
not to dictate how employers should compensate their employees.58 
                                                                                                                           
counteracts the legal rule Congress set through the EPA, even if this factor is rooted in market forces. 
Id. at 469–70; see infra note 62 (discussing the market force theory the Wernsing court denounced). 
 54 See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1231 (rejecting the idea that Rizo deepened the circuit split on prior pay 
because only the Seventh Circuit staunchly defends prior pay as a factor other than sex). 
 55 See, e.g., EEOC v. Md. Ins. Admin., 879 F.3d 114, 123 (4th Cir. 2018) (reasoning that although 
the defendant compensated employees in a “gender-neutral” way, the justification for the system had 
to be based on job-related factors); Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir. 2005) (using 
experience and education as examples of valid factors under the fourth defense); Angove v. Williams-
Sonoma, Inc., 70 F. App’x 500, 508 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that a pay system was valid because it 
did not rely solely on prior pay); Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that prior 
pay must be a “mixed-motive” justification for pay in combination with another factor); Aldrich v. 
Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1992) (interpreting that Congress meant for 
employers to have a business reason for pay distinctions under the EPA). 
 56 See Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 469 (noting that nowhere in the text of the EPA does Congress re-
quire a business-related reason to bolster the use of prior pay as a factor other than sex); Covington v. 
S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir. 1987) (referencing the Seventh Circuit’s previous rulings in 
which the court also rejected the notion that prior pay cannot be a factor other than sex). The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has come the closest to sliding out of the “middle lane” and into 
accordance with the Seventh Circuit’s hardline view. See Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (summarizing the view that a factor other than sex under the fourth defense does not need 
to be job-related); Drum v. Leeson Elec. Corp., 565 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 2009) (rejecting an 
employer’s policy basing an employee’s starting salary on a prior wage because the policy outline did not 
include an additional factor such as education or experience). The Eighth Circuit has demonstrated a 
commitment to examining EPA claims on a case-by-case basis but generally disapproves of employers 
relying solely upon prior pay to satisfy the fourth defense. See Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 720 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (reasoning that Congress included a broad exception to the EPA purposefully and, thus, an ad 
hoc approach is best). Some argue, however, that the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the EPA is 
essentially the same as the Seventh Circuit and lump the two together. See, e.g., Mariah Savage, Mon-
ey Talks: Using Prior Salary as an Affirmative Defense in Equal Pay Claims, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 
289, 303 (grouping the Seventh and Eighth Circuits together); Jeffrey K. Brown, Crossing the Line: 
The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits’ Misapplication of the Equal Pay Act’s “Any Other 
Factor Other Than Sex” Defense, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 181, 184–85 (1995) (same). 
 57 28 F.3d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 58 See id. (reiterating the court’s willingness to trust an employer’s judgment to distinguish salary 
on a “bona fide” factor, unless there is evidence to show that factor is, either in application or sub-
stance, discriminatory). In 2017, in Lauderdale v. Illinois Department of Human Services, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed its previous holdings, stating that because the plaintiff failed to adequately connect her 
employer’s consideration of her prior pay with her sex, the practice did not violate the EPA. See 876 F.3d 
904, 909 (7th Cir. 2017) (pointing to evidence in the record that the employer had legitimate budget 
concerns and was looking to make cuts, therefore the plaintiff could not establish her decreased salary 
was sex discrimination). Some scholars, however, view the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Lauderdale as 
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In 1992, in Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit established the “middle lane” view: pay dis-
tinctions must be rooted in job-related factors.59 Following Aldrich, other cir-
cuit courts similarly held that employers could not rely solely on prior pay to 
determine salary.60 These courts were concerned that prior pay flirts too closely 
with the market force theory the Supreme Court rejected in Corning Glass 
Works v. Brennan.61 The theory provides that many female-dominated jobs are 
simply lower in demand and, therefore, that lower female wages are the result 
of natural economic forces, not discrimination.62 The Court debunked this the-
ory as a hollow justification for underpaying female employees.63 Consequent-
ly, the “middle lane” courts require employers to cite a job-related factor to 
ensure that sex was unrelated to their wage-setting process.64 
                                                                                                                           
a confirmation that the court is looking for “bona fide” factors to justify the fourth defense. See Jessica 
L. Lindsted, The Seventh Circuit’s Erosion of the Equal Pay Act, ILL. INST. TECH. CHI.-KENT COLL. 
L. (Mar. 24, 2021), https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124&context=
seventhcircuitreview [https://perma.cc/Y7R2-M6WD] (implying that the Seventh Circuit tends to look 
for business-related justifications in its assessment of a “bona fide” factor unrelated to sex, even if the 
court has never stated this explicitly). 
 59 See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 526 (noting that the House Committee Report on the passage of the 
EPA described valid defenses against potential claims as “bona fide” or job-related reasons for dis-
tinctions in pay (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 2 (1963), as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 689)). 
The Second Circuit’s 1992 holding in Aldrich v. Randolph Central School District carved out an im-
portant precedent for other circuits to follow. See id. at 525 (noting that if employers could rely solely 
on prior pay under the fourth affirmative defense, this would result in a “gaping loophole” in the 
EPA). Both the Fourth and Tenth Circuits have cited Aldrich as authority for holding that employers 
invoking an affirmative defense under the fourth exception must provide job-related reasonings. See 
Md. Ins. Admin., 879 F.3d at 123 (citing Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525); Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 
1191, 1198 (10th Cir. 2015) (same). 
 60 See, e.g., Riser, 776 F.3d at 1199 (confirming that employers may look to prior pay in some 
circumstances); Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that employers can-
not use prior pay as the only justification for a salary challenged under the EPA); Irby v. Bittick, 44 
F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding the district court’s ruling that allowing prior salary to be 
the sole defense for pay disparity would “swallow up the rule” of the EPA (citing Irby v. Bittick, 830 
F. Supp. 632, 636 (M.D. Ga. 1993))). 
 61 See Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting General Mo-
tors’s market force theory argument). In 1974, in Corning Glass v. Brennan, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that, although paying women less might make fiscal sense in some industries, this would direct-
ly contradict the principle of the EPA to ensure equal pay for equal work. See 417 U.S. 188, 208 
(1974) (alluding to the concept later to be formalized as the “market force theory,” in which employ-
ers attempt to make an economic justification for discriminating against their female employees). 
 62 Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 207. Some scholars argue that allowing employers to use prior pay 
as a metric for setting salary is merely an extension of these “market excuses” that the Supreme Court 
denounced in Corning Glass. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking 
the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 176 (2011) (describing 
prior pay, initial salary offers, and wage negotiations as the three vestiges of the market force theory 
that remain legal in the courts). 
 63 Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 207. 
 64 See Gen. Motors, 841 F.2d at 1571 (citing experience or training as potential job-related fac-
tors). In 1988, in Glenn v. General Motors Corp., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit di-
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The Ninth Circuit formerly held the “middle lane” view but charted a new 
course in Rizo.65 The majority reasoned that prior pay is merely a “proxy” for 
other gendered factors, therefore, any use of prior pay to defend against an 
EPA claim would perpetuate sex discrimination.66 Meanwhile, the two concur-
ring opinions in Rizo advocated against the majority’s departure from the 
“middle lane.”67 Both concurrences expressed a concern that the majority ig-
nored the realities of the business world.68 The majority acknowledged this 
concern and admitted that allowing prior pay during salary negotiation but for-
bidding it during litigation may stymie employers.69 The majority maintained, 
however, that the EPA pertains only to what is permissible for an affirmative 
defense and explicitly confined the holding to that context.70 As such, after 
Rizo, an employer may still consider prior pay during salary negotiations, but 
the court will not allow it as a valid factor other than sex under the EPA.71 
                                                                                                                           
rectly criticized the Seventh Circuit for ignoring the Supreme Court’s holding in Corning Glass by 
allowing an employer to properly invoke the fourth defense with prior pay as the only justification. 
See id. (citing Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1987)) (criticizing the Seventh 
Circuit for using the market force theory as grounds for holding prior pay as a factor other than sex). 
 65 See Rizo v. Yovino, 950 F.3d 1217, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (reasoning that the 
holding in Kouba was contrary to the inherent purpose of the EPA (citing Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
691 F.2d 873, 876–77, 878 (9th Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 (2020). 
 66 See id. at 1228 (noting that sex-based wage discrimination is so deeply entrenched in American 
culture that it is impossible to entirely separate sex from prior pay). 
 67 Id. at 1232 (McKeown, J., concurring); id. at 1237 (Callahan, J., concurring). Rizo contained 
two concurring opinions: one penned by Judge M. Margaret McKeown, joined by Judges Richard 
Tallman and Mary Murguia, and the other by Judge Consuelo Callahan, joined by Judge Tallman and 
Judge Carlos Bea. Id. at 1232 (McKeown, J., concurring); id. at 1237 (Callahan, J., concurring). Judge 
Morgan Christen wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 1219 (majority opinion). 
 68 Id. at 1232 (McKeown, J., concurring); id. at 1237 (Callahan, J., concurring). In her concurring 
opinion, Judge McKeown stated that the majority made the same “categorical error” as the Seventh 
Circuit by eliminating consideration of prior pay altogether. Id. at 1235 (McKeown, J., concurring). 
Likewise, Judge Callahan wrote that the majority confused the standard of the fourth defense by im-
posing a job-related requirement. Id. at 1238 (Callahan, J., concurring). Judge Callahan argued that 
there is no legal justification for preventing employers from incorporating prior pay as one factor among 
many when determining an employee’s salary. Id. at 1240. Further, Judge Callahan noted that allowing 
employers to incorporate prior pay into a salary calculation is a sanctioned practice by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. at 1241 (citing Enforcement Guidance on Sex Dis-
crimination in the Compensation of Sports Coaches in Educational Institutions, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 
(1997)). Judge Callahan’s opinion openly disagreed with the majority’s premise that prior pay is al-
ways an inherently gendered factor and argued that employers should have the opportunity to demon-
strate through the fourth defense that their salary system is not discriminatory. Id. 
 69 Id. at 1232 (majority opinion). In doing so, the majority drew an important distinction between 
factors that employers are permitted to consider when negotiating salaries versus factors permitted in an 
affirmative defense to an EPA claim. Id. at 1231. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. In her concurrence, Judge McKeown described the majority’s delineation between accepta-
ble factors during salary negotiation and acceptable factors for constructing an affirmative defense as 
confusing for employers. Id. at 1235 (McKeown, J., concurring). She explained that in an effort to 
avoid potential liability under an EPA claim, employers will stop considering prior pay during salary 
negotiations as well. Id. The majority did not share Judge McKeown’s concerns, reasoning that if 
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B. How the Sausage Is Made: The Economic and Cultural  
Influences Behind an American Woman’s Salary 
In her concurring opinion in Rizo, Judge M. Margaret McKeown suggest-
ed that eliminating prior pay from the EPA’s fourth defense would harm female 
job candidates.72 Some scholars share her concern, believing that employers 
who cannot consider prior pay may resort to stereotypes detrimental to wom-
en.73 Other experts argue, however, that prior pay is dangerous because even a 
benevolent employer who genuinely wants to pay a woman more can be ad-
versely affected by knowledge of her previous salary.74 
                                                                                                                           
employers were truly basing salary on non-sex factors, then these employers would have plenty of 
other justifications available to them (i.e., experience, education, etc.) and would not need to resort to 
prior pay to justify their choices. Id. at 1231 (majority opinion). 
 72 See id. at 1232, 1235–36 (McKeown, J., concurring) (expressing concern that the majority’s 
ban on an employer’s consideration of prior pay may be to the detriment of female candidates, par-
ticularly those applying for jobs in highly competitive fields). As an example, Judge McKeown drew 
attention to industries with a limited pool of qualified job applicants, such as artificial intelligence, 
where consideration of prior pay during salary negotiations can result in more competitive job offers. 
Id. at 1235–36 (citing Cade Metz, Tech Giants are Paying Huge Salaries for Scarce A.I. Talent, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/technology/artificial-intelligence-experts-
salaries.html [https://perma.cc/4ZSX-A6G4]). Other evidence has shown, however, that even highly 
educated females in executive positions of the type Judge McKeown alludes to are generally paid less 
than male executives. Eric Frazier, Raises for Female Executives Match Those for Men, but Pay Gap 
Persists, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 2, 2008), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Raises-for-
Female-Executives/167407/ [https://perma.cc/MY7R-34ZV]. 
 73 See, e.g., Sabrina L. Brown, Negotiating Around the Equal Pay Act: Use of the “Factor Other 
Than Sex” Defense to Escape Liability, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 471, 489 (2017) (noting that women must 
often overcome negative assumptions about female behaviors in the workplace during salary negotia-
tions); Liz Davidson, A Powerful Way to Close the Pay Gap: Don’t Negotiate Salaries, FORBES (Apr. 
11, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/financialfinesse/2018/04/11/a-powerful-way-to-close-the-
pay-gap-dont-negotiate-salaries/ [https://perma.cc/JVY5-675F] (explaining how salary negotiations 
tend to yield less favorable results for women); see also Noam Scheiber, If a Law Bars Asking Your 
Past Salary, Does It Help or Hurt?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/
16/business/economy/salary-history-laws.html [https://perma.cc/66SR-A7FZ] (reporting that some 
people believe employers that are unable to inquire about prior pay may assume female candidates 
will settle for lower salary offers based on the stereotype that women tend to make less than men). 
Fortunately, there is a legal barricade against such stereotyping. See JAMES KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT 
DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND LITIGATION § 7.1 (2020) (noting that courts rou-
tinely reject employers’ attempts to pay women less based on antiquated ideas of female gender roles 
(citing as examples Sessions v. Moralles-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017); United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515 (1996); and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982))). Other 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, deter companies from pay discrimination by requiring them to 
publicly disclose their gender pay ratio. See Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Securities Disclo-
sure as Soundbite: The Case of CEO Pay Ratios, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1194 (2019) (discussing the 
difference between gender gap ratios and general pay ratios and the impact of their respective disclo-
sures). 
 74 See Bourree Lam, The Government Thinks That Interview Questions About Salary History Are 
Holding Women Back, The ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2015/08/hiring-interview-gender-gap-pay-salary-history-opm/400835/ [https://perma.cc/X66J-ES8N] 
(discussing the effect of anchoring, a phenomenon in behavioral economics that refers to the brain’s 
implicit bias to skew a final decision toward the first piece of information given). One study on the 
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An array of studies and reports on the pay gap from recent years show 
that the issue cannot be distilled to one cause.75 That said, the Rizo court is not 
alone in promulgating the theory that prior pay perpetuates the pay gap.76 Sev-
eral state and federal legislatures, for example, have proposed schemes that 
forbid hiring managers from asking a female job candidate her current wage.77 
Regardless, the reality remains that there is a persistent pay gap in the United 
                                                                                                                           
effects of anchoring reported that anchoring is particularly common in salary negotiations. Todd J. 
Thorsteinson, Initiating Salary Discussions with an Extreme Request: Anchoring Effects on Initial 
Salary Offers, 41 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1774, 1775 (2011). Further, anchoring can have an espe-
cially large impact in salary negotiations for high-level positions without a defined pay range. Id. at 
1789. 
 75 See Sarah Jane Glynn, Gender Wage Inequality: What We Know and How We Can Fix It, 
WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH 11 (2018), http://cdn.equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/04/09040142/040918-pay-inequality2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P389-SYSQ] (noting that many 
argue the pay gap is likely the result of a combination of forces including education, work history, 
family life, and labor force participation). One factor hugely correlative to the pay gap is race, as women 
of color experience even greater discrepancies in their compensation compared to white men than white 
women. See Stephen Miller, Black Workers Still Earn Less Than Their White Counterparts, SOC’Y FOR 
HUM. RES. MGMT., https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/compensation/pages/racial-wage-
gaps-persistence-poses-challenge.aspx (June 11, 2020) (stating that Black women in high-paying jobs, 
such as lawyers or doctors, earn about 63% of the salary paid to white men holding the same posi-
tions); Danielle Paquette, Court: Employers Can’t Pay Women Less Because of Their Salary History, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/04/09/court-
employers-cant-pay-women-less-because-of-their-salary-history/ [https://perma.cc/3PUE-CNRF] (re-
porting that Black and Hispanic women make even less money per dollar than the average man as 
compared to white women). 
 76 See Memorandum from Beth F. Koburt, Acting Director, on U.S. Office on Personnel Manage-
ment, on Additional Guidance on Advancing Pay Equality in the Federal Government (July 30, 2015), 
https://www.chcoc.gov/content/additional-guidance-advancing-pay-equality-federal-government 
[https://perma.cc/BB3T-YWM4] (releasing a government-wide memorandum encouraging federal 
employers not to consider an employee’s existing salary during wage negotiations). For example, the 
Office of Personnel Management released a memorandum instructing federal hiring managers to focus 
on factors such as the candidate’s experience because an applicant’s current pay may not be an accu-
rate representation of their suitability for the job. Id. 
 77 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(a) (West 2021) (forbidding employers from using “salary 
history” to set wages); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40z(7)(c) (2021) (noting that prospective em-
ployees are not required to reveal their previous salary to an employer); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 
§ 709B(b)(2) (2021) (stating employers shall not “seek the compensation history” of job candidates); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(c)(2) (2021) (making it unlawful for an employer to inquire about 
the previous wage of a “prospective employee”); Ill Exec. Order No. 2019-02 (Jan. 15, 2019) (specifi-
cally stating that requesting prior wage information “disadvantages women”); see also Savage, supra 
note 56, at 307 (discussing local efforts to pass legislative reform on prior pay). At the federal level, 
the Senate proposed a piece of legislation called the Paycheck Fairness Act that would disallow em-
ployers from using prior pay in the hiring process. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 819, 115th Cong. § 8(a) 
(2017). The House of Representatives passed the legislation in March 2019, the Senate read it for a 
second time in April 2019, and it remains pending on the Senate’s Legislative Calendar. H.R.7—
Paycheck Fairness Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7/
actions [https://perma.cc/2BBK-4LHT]. 
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States, and scholarly reports and available data suggest that prior pay may be 
partly to blame.78 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT PRIOR  
PAY IS NOT A FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2020 decision in Rizo v. 
Yovino honors the heart of the EPA: ending wage discrimination on the basis of 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Nikki Graf, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent, Gender Gap in 
Pay, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK BLOG (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2019/03/22/gender-pay-gap-facts/ [https://perma.cc/S8P2-B5UP] (reporting that the rate of decrease 
in the pay gap has been stagnant for the past several years). Scholars have noted that it is nearly impos-
sible to pin the entire problem on one culprit. See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender 
Pay Gap: Have Women Gone as Far as They Can?, 21 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 843, 845, 847 (2007) 
(weighing a conglomeration of factors such as labor force participation rates, educational attainment, 
trends in de-unionization of male-dominated professions, and market demand for experienced workers). 
Only half of the pay gap can be explained by non-gendered factors such as education or experience, thus 
sex-based discrimination likely plays a role. See Savage, supra note 56, at 289 (noting that prior pay is a 
“shadowy concept,” and it can be difficult to discern its particular impact on the pay gap). For example, 
women are generally relegated to positions that are lower paid. See LEANIN.ORG & MCKINSEY & CO., 
WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 11 (2019), https://wiw-report.s3.amazonaws.com/Women_in_the_
Workplace_2019.pdf (reporting that women hold 38% of managerial positions compared to 62% of men 
because women are promoted less often); see also NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., ASKING FOR SALARY HIS-
TORY PERPETUATES PAY DISCRIMINATION FROM JOB TO JOB 2 (Dec. 2018), https://nwlc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Asking-for-Salary-History-Perpetuates-Discrimination-1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5WXY-MJ2K] (stating that women are more likely to have work experience in jobs that pay less). 
Therefore, some argue, a prior salary may not be a true reflection of a woman’s potential productivity but 
merely a result of unrelated social forces outside of her control. See Sarah Green Carmichael, Women 
Dominate College Majors That Lead to Lower-Paying Work, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/04/women-dominate-college-majors-that-lead-to-lower-paying-work [https://
perma.cc/8KTR-BZJW] (showing that college-educated women tend to major in fields that lead to 
lower paying jobs than college-educated men). Others argue that women are paid less than men be-
cause, traditionally, women have borne the brunt of childrearing and household responsibilities. See 
Jillian Berman, Women’s Unpaid Work Is the Backbone of the American Economy, MKT. WATCH 
(Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-is-how-much-more-unpaid-work-women-
do-than-men-2017-03-07 [https://perma.cc/JD49-YSQ6] (reporting that women are often overlooked 
for career opportunities because it is presumed that they will be laden with family responsibilities and 
that once a woman leaves her job for more than six months, her baseline salary never recovers). Alt-
hough evidence shows traditional gender roles have been evolving in recent years, events like the global 
COVID-19 pandemic have revealed that American women are still more inclined to take on unpaid 
household and family duties. See LEANIN.ORG & MCKINSEY & CO., supra, at 38 (showing that, over-
all, younger women in dual-income households bear less of the household responsibility than the older 
generation); Claire Cain Miller, Nearly Half of Men Say They Do Most of the Home Schooling, 3 Per-
cent of Women Agree, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/upshot/
pandemic-chores-homeschooling-gender.html [https://perma.cc/C4XH-ZR7D] (reporting that the 
COVID-19 pandemic has entrenched traditional gender roles); see also Rebecca Sewall, The Pandem-
ic Brings the Value of Women’s Unpaid Work into Focus, CREATIVE ASSOCS. INT’L INSIGHTS BLOG 
(Apr. 9, 2020), http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/insights/the-pandemic-brings-the-
value-of-womens-unpaid-work-into-focus/ [https://perma.cc/EPQ6-QFTR] (projecting that if Ameri-
can women were paid minimum wage for their unpaid labor, they would have earned approximately 
$1.5 trillion in 2019). 
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sex.79 Although Congress included the fourth defense to give employers lee-
way in their business practices, that flexibility was not meant to overpower the 
EPA’s underlying spirit of sex equality.80 Section A of this Part explains why a 
woman’s salary is intrinsically gendered and thus can never be a factor unre-
lated to sex.81 Section B discusses the Rizo majority and concurrences and 
suggests that the majority could have more brazenly rejected the role prior pay 
plays in salary negotiations.82 
A. Female Salaries Cannot Be Separated from Gendered Influences 
Courts cannot properly decide whether a particular factor, such as prior 
pay, is a factor other than sex without fully understanding it.83 The Ninth Cir-
cuit correctly understood that prior pay can never be a factor other than sex 
because female salaries are loaded with decades of socioeconomic baggage.84 
The fact is: prior pay is inextricably entangled with sex.85 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 2 (1963), as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 688 (summarizing 
that the primary purpose of the EPA was to eliminate sex-based wage discrimination). 
 80 See id. at 3, U.S.C.C.A.N. 689 (clarifying that the purpose of the exceptions to the EPA was 
simply to make room for “legitimate differences in pay”); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 
188, 208 (1974) (affirming that Congress intended the EPA to be “broadly remedial,” and any policy 
that supports paying the genders differently for the same work would run against the legislative in-
tent); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing bona fide in-
tents (citing Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989)). The EPA has challenged the 
courts to balance the freedom to allow businesses to pay their employees according to their needs and 
the desire to prevent continued discrimination against women. See Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 720 
(8th Cir. 2003) (describing the court’s difficulty balancing Congress’s dual intent to prevent employ-
ers from implementing discriminatory policies while also allowing them flexibility to make business 
decisions). 
 81 See infra notes 83–93 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 94–106 and accompanying text. 
 83 See Rizo v. Yovino, 950 F.3d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (referencing previous hold-
ings from the Eighth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits that have observed the statistically gendered nature 
of prior pay and factored that observation into their reasoning (citing Taylor, 321 F.3d at 718; Irby v. 
Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 
1982))), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 189 (2020). In 2020, in Rizo v. Yovino, the Ninth Circuit discussed 
data showing how the wage gap between men and women has persisted over decades, the pronounced 
negative effects of wage discrimination on women of color, and other factors such as education that 
have historically disadvantaged women in the workplace. Id. (citing U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., HIGH-
LIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2017, at 1–2 (2018) https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-
earnings/2018/pdf/home.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2TX-8BFL]). This analysis directly impacted the 
court’s ultimate decision that prior pay is an inherently gendered factor. Id. 
 84 See Glynn, supra note 75, at 7 (enumerating the confluence of factors that contribute to lower 
salaries for women). Women tend to be siloed to professional roles and industries that receive less 
compensation than men, creating an approximately $404 billion difference in total wages earned be-
tween the two genders. Id. Other factors such as race, region, and blatant discrimination also exacer-
bate the gender pay gap. Id. 
 85 See id. (enumerating myriad sex-based factors that affect prior pay). Studies have shown that a 
female candidate’s previous wage can influence even the most benevolent employers. Thorsteinson, 
supra note 74, at 1786; see also NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., supra note 78, at 1 (noting that even if an 
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Judge McKeown criticized the majority’s ruling as extreme.86 She sug-
gested that women vying for competitive jobs may lose out on higher salary 
offers if the law bans prior pay from the conversation.87 First, nothing in the 
majority’s ruling prevents a woman from volunteering her previous wage to a 
prospective employer to leverage a better offer.88 The majority was clear that 
its holding is cabined to factors an employer may raise in an EPA suit, not a 
salary negotiation.89 Second, it was misleading for Judge McKeown to imply 
that the majority’s decision will disadvantage a significant number of wom-
en.90 On the contrary, data suggests that previous wage numbers hinder more 
women than they help.91 Thus, Judge McKeown’s reasoning, which Judge 
Consuelo Callahan echoed, reveals a misunderstanding of what goes on behind 
the curtain of a woman’s salary.92 The majority was correct in holding that pri-
                                                                                                                           
employer has the budget or desire to pay a female employee a higher wage, knowledge of her previous 
salary may sway the employer to make a lower offer due to the influence of anchoring). Knowing a 
woman’s prior pay hugely tips the scales to an employer’s advantage during salary negotiation, regardless 
of the employer’s intentions. Thorsteinson, supra note 67, at 1786; see also Davidson, supra note 73 
(pointing out that employers in negotiations are motivated to pursue the lowest salary they think a 
woman will accept). Moreover, before the negotiation process even begins, female job applicants are 
swimming upstream to fight against economic and cultural currents that have been working against them 
for decades. See Blau & Kahn, supra note 78, at 845 (contextualizing the pay gap among a range of 
socioeconomic forces such as educational attainment, on-the-job training, and other factors that have 
determined a woman’s position in the workforce since World War II). 
 86 See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1232 (McKeown, J., concurring) (stating that the majority “goes too far” 
by eliminating prior pay from the scope of EPA defenses entirely). 
 87 See id. at 1235 (discussing the possibility that the majority opinion may prevent employers 
from offering salaries attractive enough to draw female candidates with a rare or specific skill set 
within competitive industries). 
 88 Compare id. at 1236 (arguing that the legislature should decide whether a woman can reveal 
her salary history during a job negotiation, not the judiciary), with id. at 1231 (majority opinion) (re-
butting the concurring judges’ suggestion that the holding hinders women in competitive job markets 
who choose to share their previous wage during salary negotiations). 
 89 See id. at 1231 (majority opinion) (clarifying that the holding applies only to employers in the 
context of EPA litigation and the available affirmative defenses and has no bearing on the factors an 
employer may consider during a salary negotiation). 
 90 See id. (McKeown, J., concurring) (raising the possibility that the majority’s decision might 
inhibit women vying for high profile jobs in vanguard industries, such as artificial intelligence) (citing 
Metz, supra note 72)). 
 91 See Frazier, supra note 72 (reporting that in 2006, female CEOs and executives at large corpo-
rations saw a 7.4% median increase in their salaries compared to the 7.2% increase enjoyed by their 
male counterparts, but still earned less money overall); Davidson, supra note 73 (noting that even 
women with graduate degrees in business achieve worse outcomes than men do in salary negotia-
tions); see also Miller, supra note 75 (noting the disproportionate effect of the pay gap on Black 
women); Paquette, supra note 75 (showing how women of color experience heightened pay discrimi-
nation). 
 92 Compare Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1237 (McKeown, J., concurring) (arguing that a woman’s previous 
salary can symbolize her achievements), and id. at 1241 (Callahan, J., concurring) (stating that prior 
pay is not an automatically gendered factor), with supra note 78 (discussing the many studies and 
reports that have consistently shown how socioeconomic trends have depreciated women’s salaries 
and persisted the pay gap in the United States for generations). 
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or pay cannot be parsed from the confluence of gendered forces that have de-
flated female wages for decades and, therefore, that it can never be a factor 
other than sex.93 
B. The Rizo Holding Could Have Gone One Step Further 
The Ninth Circuit was also correct to invalidate the “middle lane” argu-
ment the concurrences supported.94 The idea that prior pay is discriminatory 
when standing alone, but not discriminatory when accompanied by a job-
related factor, is untenable.95 What separates the permissible scenario from the 
impermissible one is the job-related factor, not prior pay.96 Therefore, prior pay 
does not need to be part of the equation at all.97 
The concurring judges were concerned that the Rizo decision would trap 
employers by allowing them to use prior pay during salary negotiation, thereby 
exposing them to liability.98 The majority dismissed the issue by reiterating 
that the holding has no bearing on what an employer can do during salary ne-
gotiation.99 This is where the majority missed an opportunity to take Rizo one 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1229 (recognizing the history of “wage discrimination” against women in 
the United States). The majority concluded that because pay inequity is so entrenched in the American 
labor economy, prior pay cannot serve as a reliable indicator of an employer’s neutrality about an 
employee’s sex. Id. Further, the Ninth Circuit noted that Congress passed the EPA to be a stopgap 
against this long-standing inequality and, therefore, that allowing any trace of discrimination to persist 
under the guise of the law would be repugnant to the legislative purpose. See id. (reasoning that “prior 
pay may carry with it the effects of sex-based discrimination” Congress meant to target by passing the 
EPA). 
 94 See id. at 1230 (first citing Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2015); then 
citing Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423 F.3d 606, 612–13 (6th Cir. 2005); and then citing Irby v. Bittick, 44 
F.3d 949, 955, 957 (11th Cir. 1995)) (criticizing other circuits for holding that prior pay is valid when 
used in conjunction with another non-sex factor). 
 95 See id. (accusing the other circuit courts of “shift[ing] gears” on prior pay once other factors 
are involved). 
 96 Compare Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that an 
employer’s salary scheme violated the EPA because it relied solely on the employees’ previous wag-
es), with Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 70 F. App’x 500, 508 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding an em-
ployer’s wage-setting procedure as permissible under the EPA’s fourth affirmative defense because 
the system factored in the employee’s experience along with prior pay). 
 97 See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1230 (stating unequivocally that of the permissible factors other than sex, 
prior pay is “not one of them”). 
 98 See id. at 1236 (McKeown, J., concurring) (describing the “tension” the majority caused for 
employers trying to navigate salary negotiations legally and claiming the holding “handcuffs employ-
ers”); infra note 99 and accompanying text (addressing this concern over the majority opinion). 
 99 See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1232 (majority opinion) (acknowledging the “tension” referenced in 
Judge McKeown’s concurring opinion). The majority reasoned that any potential confusion between 
factors an employer may consider in salary negotiation versus EPA litigation is a result of how Con-
gress constructed the statute. Id. The language is limited to the parameters of the four available af-
firmative defenses, and, therefore, the court may only address what the employer can do within that 
context. Id. 
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step further.100 On a purely practical basis, Judge McKeown is right that Rizo 
effectively bars employers from using prior pay in salary negotiations if they 
wish to avoid future liability.101 Indeed, if an employer incorporates prior pay 
into its salary decision-making at all, the employee could later claim that her 
salary was based on a discriminatory factor.102 The majority discounted this 
consequence when it could have openly embraced it.103 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that prior pay is intrinsically discriminatory 
should have equally powerful implications for salary negotiations as it does for 
litigation if the pay gap is ever to be closed.104 Instead of assuaging its naysay-
ers by saying its new precedent will not impact salary negotiation, the Ninth 
Circuit should have been unapologetic about the natural effect its decision will 
have on the future of salary negotiations.105 In other words, the Ninth Circuit 
should have said: prior pay can never be a factor other than sex, and yes, that 
means it would be ill-advised for an employer to consider prior pay when de-
termining a prospective female employee’s salary.106 
CONCLUSION 
Congress passed the EPA over fifty years ago, and yet women in this 
country still do not receive equal pay for equal work. As Justice Ginsburg 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See id. (asserting that nothing in the opinion prevents employers from raising the topic of a job 
candidate’s previous wages in a salary negotiation). 
 101 See id. at 1236 (McKeown, J., concurring) (stating that the majority’s holding leaves “little 
daylight” for employers to treat salary negotiations differently from EPA defenses). 
 102 See id. at 1232 (majority opinion) (recognizing the “inherent tension” in allowing employers 
to include prior pay in their salary-setting practices on the frontend but then disallowing prior pay as a 
defense for those same practices during litigation). 
 103 See id. (dismissing the concerns of the concurring judges). 
 104 Contra id. at 1231 (reasoning that prior pay should not be treated the same in EPA litigation as 
in salary negotiations because the EPA statutory construction is limited to the permissible factors 
available to employers in litigation). Allowing prior pay to be a part of salary negotiations perpetuates 
the pay gap because, statistically, a woman’s previous wage will not be an accurate reflection of her 
worth. See id. at 1229 (explaining that the pay gap remains an ongoing problem in the United States). 
See generally supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing the breadth of research available to 
explain why female employees tend to receive lower wages than male employees in the same job). 
 105 See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1232 (reassuring the concurring judges that the majority opinion will not 
impact employers in salary-setting). It is not the court’s role to dole out legal incentives, but it is certain-
ly well within the court’s purview to promote Congress’s legislative intent and give deference to its poli-
cy goals. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974) (placing Congress’s intent in 
passing the EPA at the center of its holding to reject an employer’s unequal pay to male and female 
employees). Restricting an employer’s ability to consider prior pay furthers the EPA’s legislative pur-
pose. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-309, at 2, as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 688 (stating the purpose of 
the legislation is to compensate employees performing the same work equally “regardless of sex”). 
Prior pay and its role in salary-setting is repugnant to the EPA’s purpose because, as the data shows, 
women continually receive lower salaries despite performing the same work as men. Stewart, supra note 
7; Glynn, supra note 75, at 7; LEANIN.ORG & MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 78, at 11. 
 106 See Rizo, 950 F.3d at 1231 (limiting its analysis to the EPA’s affirmative defenses). 
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warned, nebulous obstacles like prior pay continue to lurk in the shadows and 
impede women from closing the nineteen-cent gap that separates them from 
their male colleagues. The decision in Rizo v. Yovino will help stem the tide of 
the pay gap by eliminating prior pay as an affirmative defense in EPA litiga-
tion. Only time will tell if other legislative or judicial reforms will help close 
the pay gap for good. But one thing is certain: in the meantime, women across 
America will continue to wake up every morning and go to work for a country 
that consistently underpays them. 
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